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Abstract
The overjustification effect posits that rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, such that an
individual’s engagement in previously intrinsically motivating tasks will decrease when a
previously reliable reward is withdrawn. This study aimed to determine if this overjustification
effect can be demonstrated in rats, with typical confounds related to social and verbal aspects of
reward delivery controlled for. Baseline “intrinsic” wheel-running rates of seven SpragueDawley rats were compared to rates that followed administration and withdrawal of a contingent
sucrose reward, and to rates of rats in control conditions (n = 7). Consistent with the author’s
hypothesis, the reward group’s wheel-running did not decrease below the initial baseline
following this procedure, as would be predicted by the overjustification hypothesis. This
suggests that the overjustification effect demonstrated in humans may be better conceptualized as
being related to social and verbal aspects of rewards rather than as an inherent feature of reward
administration and withdrawal.
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Background
Intrinsic motivation—a factor that seems to significantly modulate behavior in the
absence of obvious externally imposed reinforcement contingencies—has been the subject of
much formal research and debate for more than half a century. Harlow and colleagues (1950)
found that rhesus monkeys solved puzzles without apparently being rewarded for doing so and
concluded that they performed the tasks for the intrinsic reward of engaging in the manipulation
and arriving at a solution. That is, simply solving the puzzle successfully seems to have rewarded
the effort. Humans seem to engage in similar intrinsically motivated behavior—notably play and
exploration—in the absence of obvious external or programmed contingencies. Some argue that
humans, like Harlow et al.’s monkeys, are intrinsically motivated to engage in such activities,
and have posed various theories regarding how this motivation develops. What determines if
aspects of a behavior are intrinsically motivating to an individual and how do individuals come
to be rewarded by the built-in structural and formal outcomes of those activities?
In their self-determination theory, Ryan and Deci (2000) proposed that individuals are
motivated by needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy, each of which is necessary to
facilitate optimal personality functioning and growth of the individual. Nested within selfdetermination theory is the cognitive evaluation theory, which assumes that behavior that allows
an individual to feel competent and self-determining is innately intrinsically motivating (Deci et
al., 1975). The theory asserts that extrinsic rewards can undermine this intrinsic motivation by
either changing the locus of causality to a source outside of the task, reducing the individual’s
perception of competence and self-determination, or both (Deci et al., 1975). Furthermore, if an
individual engages in the task in the presence of an extrinsic reward, according to the related
self-perception theory, that person might conclude that the behavior was done partially or
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entirely for the reward rather than enjoyment—and thus will be less likely to participate in the
same activity when the reward is removed (Bem, 1967). In the presence and subsequent
attribution of other external causes, the individual is said to “discount” the role of intrinsic
factors (Kelley, 1987). This discounting of intrinsic motivation through extrinsic rewards is
known as the overjustification effect and is predicted regardless of whether the reward is tangible
or symbolic (Lepper et al., 1973).
Overjustification Effect
Deci (1971) reported initial support for the overjustification theory using a paradigm
which has now become a standard method of investigation in this area. A task (a puzzle) was
chosen that was assumed to be intrinsically motivating, and participants’ engagement in the
puzzle was measured at three points: at baseline (puzzles done without reward), after being
extrinsically rewarded (given $1 per puzzle completed), and after being told rewards were no
longer available. The amount of time participants spent engaging in the activity decreased from
baseline when the reward was removed, leading Deci to conclude that intrinsic motivation for the
task had decreased in the presence of an external reward. Other studies of this type seem to
produce similar results (Dollinger & Thelen, 1978; Pittman et al., 1977; Warneken & Tomasello,
2008).
Closer examination suggests that the overjustification effect may not be the most
parsimonious explanation of the results of Deci’s study and those like it. That is, the relationship
between external rewards and intrinsic interest may be more complex than Ryan and Deci’s
(2000) theory suggests. For instance, Deci (1971) found evidence that seemed to support the
overjustification effect when using money as a reward but not when verbal praise was used. To
explain this apparent discrepancy, Deci argued that “money and closely related tangible rewards
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may have some peculiar property associated with them” (p. 107). He suggested that, because
money is used for buying things, the experimenter may have communicated to the participants
that they probably should not engage in the activity without pay and should not be intrinsically
motivated by it. However, the attribution of this “peculiar property” solely to money and “closely
related tangible rewards” is arbitrary. If an individual attributes their behavior to an external
contingency established by another human, it communicates to them that the contingency-setter
believes a reward is necessary to facilitate engagement, and therefore, the task must be
undesirable.
Although Deci (1971) suggested that the overjustification effect may be related to a
unique property of money and similar rewards, Lepper and colleagues (1973) asserted that the
nature of the reward (tangible or symbolic) is irrelevant if the individual perceives themselves as
engaging in the activity to obtain an extrinsic goal. Lepper and colleagues (1973) tested a version
of the overjustification paradigm in preschool children: They selected children who engaged to
some degree in a coloring activity (and thus were assumed to be intrinsically motivated to color),
and assigned them randomly to three conditions. In the “expected reward” condition, participants
were told they would be given a “Good Player” award if they engaged in the coloring activity. In
the “surprise reward” condition, no reward contingency was established prior to engaging in the
activity, but participants received a certificate upon completion of the task. Finally, the control
group was not informed of any reward contingencies, nor did they receive a reward for coloring.
The participants were observed after the experimental phase, and the authors found that
individuals who received an expected reward engaged in the coloring activity approximately
51% less than the unrewarded group in the subsequent phase when the reward was no longer
available, providing what Lepper and colleagues (1973) claimed to be support for the
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overjustification hypothesis. However, the children in the surprise reward condition colored at
(statistically) the same rate as the unrewarded children, and children with lower baseline rates of
coloring colored more in the experimental condition, suggesting that the promise of rewards,
rather than their externality to the task, was the key factor in the difference. That is, as proposed
by Deci (1971), understanding the role of intrinsic rewards on is not simply about reinforcement
contingencies but can be embedded in people’s perceptions of social expectations relative to the
rewards.
To extend this analysis, there is little evidence that children of the age of those who
participated in Lepper and colleagues’ (1973) study are able to reliably employ the discounting
principle that supposedly controlled their behavior (Miller, 1985; Smith, 1975). A socialdevelopmental model of discounting suggests that this ability requires both sufficient cognitive
development and exposure to relevant experiences of rewards being associated with aversive
tasks (Kassin & Ellis, 1988). Such a model posits that, through experience with adult-mediated
contingencies, children develop a schema that rewards are typically used when the task is
undesirable, and that this generalizes from context-specific experiences to all rewards. Kassin
and Ellis (1988) found that the tendency for a child to discount intrinsic motives was related to
both their age and to their experiences of receiving a reward for an undesirable task in a similar
context to the situation being examined. In Lepper and colleagues’ (1973) study, the children in
the “expected reward” group were not just getting a reward but being offered a deal by an adult.
The children likely had a history of receiving rewards for engaging in undesirable academic tasks
in a school setting, and thus, in offering such a deal, the experimenters may have activated this
discounting schema and communicated to the children that coloring was likely to be undesirable.
This would suggest that a prior history or rewards being paired with aversive tasks may explain
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the observed decrease in engagement rather than the presence of the reward. Thus, the most
important factor was not that the children were being given a reward, but that they were being
given an unpleasant chore to do. Subsequent research and meta-analyses of the overjustification
literature are mixed, with some studies and meta-analyses showing support for the
overjustification effect (Deci et al., 1999; Rummel & Feinberg, 1988; Tang & Hall, 1995;
Wiersma, 1992) but others showing an effect only in specific circumstances (e.g., Condry, 1977;
Dickinson, 1989; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1998; Pierce & Cameron, 2002)—particularly when
the rewards were contingent on a relevant dimension of the task, such as proficiency, rather than
for mere engagement in it.
Why Is This Important?
Despite evidence that the interaction between motivation and contingencies may be more
nuanced than a simple overjustification effect suggests, the results from Deci (1971), Lepper and
colleagues (1973), and similar studies have had a far-reaching impact on several fields.
Proponents of the overjustification effect voice strong convictions that “extrinsic rewards may
usurp the control of intrinsic rewards and permanently decrease their reinforcing value” (Skaggs
et al., 1991, p. 45). The overjustification effect continues to be cited in media and undergraduate
textbooks: Zimbardo’s (1992) introductory textbook cleverly touts “A reward a day makes work
out of play” (p. 454, italics in the original), which is certainly at least an oversimplification.
Additionally, some have applied these findings to discourage the use of rewards to change
behavior in the workplace (Olafsen et al., 2015), marketing (Anghelcev, 2015), healthy food
choices (Cooke et al., 2011), and even altruistic behavior (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008).
Teachers and parents are warned about incentivizing learning (e.g., Condry, 1977; Dickinson,
1989; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Albert Einstein is even quoted as having said the following about
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exams: “This coercion had such a deterring effect that, after I had passed the final examination, I
found the consideration of any scientific problems distasteful to me for an entire year”
(Bernstein, 1973, p. 88, as cited in Condry, 1977)—even though this statement seems more
consistent with the interpretation that some elements of overjustification are not due to the
reward itself, but it being embedded in demands. This fear of the overjustification effect has been
propagated throughout the public by individuals whose names carry with them a degree of
authority (see also, Kohn, 1993).
The overgeneralization and oversimplification of the relatively inconsistent finding
regarding the effects of external rewards on intrinsic motivation—without examining the
conditions in which they are true—unnecessarily takes a valuable tool out of the hands of
teachers and parents to help children and others achieve necessary goals. As argued by Cameron
and Pierce (2002), such a view may have a disproportionately negative impact on children of
lower socioeconomic status. Children whose parents are well-educated are more likely to grow
up in an environment that is enriching, with learning happening within the context of fun
activities. In contrast, parents of lower education and socioeconomic status may not have the
time and resources to model the value of education to their children or provide a high rate of
enriching experiences, such as trips to museums or purchasing the trending children’s books.
Similarly, teachers in school districts with fewer resources may be unable to provide an
environment in which a child exuberantly engages in all academic activities of their own accord.
That is, regimentation of the academic experience can be economical relative to providing
individualized opportunities. It is therefore harmful to take away a tool that could incentivize
building necessary skills for these children. It is possible that providing an external incentive for
a child may enable them to build skills and confidence in that area and set them up for success in
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future activities. A more careful examination of the literature and of the conditions necessary for
the overjustification effect to occur is necessary, given what is at stake. Such investigation must
start with an examination of the intrinsic motivation construct.
Intrinsic Motivation
The basic conception of intrinsic motivation and methods of study are reasonably
consistent across the literature. Participants are exposed to a task under differing conditions (e.g.,
getting a reward or not), and then this reward is removed. The participant is left alone in the
room with the target task in addition to other unrelated tasks, in a phase referred to as the free
choice period (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The assumption is that, without the obvious extrinsic reward
in place, any engagement the participant has with the target task can only be explained by
intrinsic motivation. Thus, time spent engaging in the task is the metric for measuring intrinsic
motivation.
Obviously, a complex socially embedded construct that is so simply conceived is likely to
be oversimplified. There is debate as to whether intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can be
dichotomously categorized, and such a distinction is often arbitrary (Dickinson, 1989). Intrinsic
motivation is generally defined as engagement in an activity despite apparent extrinsic rewards
(Dickinson, 1989), yet the intrinsic behavior itself could serve as a conditioned reinforcer for
something else (Skinner, 1953), or social desirability may motivate responding despite the
withdrawal of tangible rewards. The design assumes that there are no covert external
contingencies at play, a possibility which is virtually impossible to rule out in humans. Finally,
as will be discussed in further detail, the external rewards present in Lepper and colleagues’
(1973) study were established by instructions, and in addition to the children having a history of
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reinforcement for adherence to instructions, instructed or rule governed behavior has been found
to be insensitive to contingencies (Catania et al., 1989; Hayes et al., 1986).
Given the potential competing explanations for the behaviors observed in these studies, a
more controlled experiment is needed. In this case, for the verbal and social aspects of the
overjustification situation. Thus, this study used rats as subjects and thus allowed for more
experimental control, as it was simpler to determine if their behavior is solely motivated by
intrinsic factors. Specifically, it was possible to only select rats who do not have a history of the
intrinsic task serving as a reinforcer. Additionally, rats are not motivated by socially desirable
responding, contingencies can be better controlled, and the dichotomy between intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards was better preserved. Finally, using rats as subjects, who are less vulnerable to
attrition, made a multiple-treatment reversal design more feasible, the benefits of which will be
discussed next. This approach is not without precedent. This experiment was modeled on similar
work by Belke and Pierce (2015) but incorporated modifications to make the results more
specific to the overjustification question.
Problems Addressed Through a Multiple-Treatment Reversal Design
The typical paradigm previously discussed might appear to be a reversal design,
sometimes also categorized as a time-series type design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), in which
the subjects are observed to do something without consequences, then with consequences, and
then again without. The behavior in the final baseline is usually the subject of interest in studies
of overjustification. However, unlike the typical ABA reversal arrangement in which there are
repeated measures in each condition (e.g., multiple daily sessions), the baseline (A) often
consists of only a single brief observation of behavior immediately preceding the treatment
phase, which often also is a single encounter (B; see e.g., Deci, 1971). Then the final baseline
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phase, like the initial baseline, might consist of a single observation period rather than multiple
exposures. It is also typical that the rewarding effect of the consequence is assumed rather than
demonstrated (Mawhinney, 1979). That is, a certificate might or might not be of any particular
interest to a child, whereas (as in the present experiment) the rewarding effect of food to a
hungry organism is rarely in doubt: The present study used deprivation and food rewards, thus
increasing the likelihood that the rewards were actually rewarding. Additionally, it consisted of
multiple treatment and baseline phases, in an ABABA design, and initial baseline intrinsic
interest was collected across multiple sessions. This was done to control for several issues, such
as habituation on task and regression towards the mean, which will be discussed in turn.
Habituation on Task
A confounding construct that is difficult to control in the typical ABA design is that
rewarding the behavior generally leads to engaging in the task for a longer time than the
participant might otherwise. For instance, in Deci’s (1971) experiment, participants in the reward
group spent 34% more total time on the task compared to controls. Thus, the reward condition is
confounded with longer engagement with the task than the control group. It is possible that
individuals become habituated to stimuli associated with the activity after prolonged engagement
maintained by the reinforcer, causing them to temporarily avoid, or reduce engagement with, the
activity following the removal of the reinforcement. This effect would provide an alternative
explanation, or at least an important additional factor, to account for the decrease in engagement
from baseline observed by some studies after the treatment phase. In support of this, a pattern
consistent with habituation can be observed in behavior of control groups in some studies, where
engagement in the task levels off after a period of time (e.g., Dollinger & Thelen, 1978).
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Attempts to control for habituation, when present, are often inadequate. Lepper and
colleagues (1973) attempted to control for habituation by limiting the experimental phase to 6
minutes but did not limit contact with the task in the baseline phase, so the cumulative contact
with the task could have resulted in habituation. Their finding supports this explanation:
individuals who engaged in the task the most during the baseline phase (i.e., the high interest
group) showed a greater decrease in engagement in the posttest phase than individuals who
colored less in the baseline phase. Although the authors cited this as evidence that the
overjustification effect was strongest for highly intrinsically motivating tasks, a more
parsimonious explanation is that the high interest group had more total contact with the task and
had habituated on it by the posttest phase.
A better way to control for habituation, and the method used by this study, is to include
more pretest data so that measurements of engagement are taken at multiple time points prior to
the administration of a reward. There is some evidence in human studies that this control is
important. Peters and Vollmer’s (2014) extended baseline study found that prolonged exposure
to a preferred activity without contingencies resulted in a similar decrease in responding to what
was observed in the contingency condition, further supporting that habituation may be a better
explanation of results than an overjustification-type effect. Mynatt and colleagues (1978) found
similar results in their extended baseline study. Still, some studies do not include a pretest
measure of engagement (Dollinger & Thelen, 1978; Pittman et al., 1977; Warneken &
Tomasello, 2008), and those that do often only measure engagement at one point in time (e.g.,
Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Lepper et al., 1973). Using rats as subjects allows for establishing a
baseline using many sessions without the issues of attrition and overburdening that would occur
using human participants. The few rat studies on the overjustification effect had initial baseline
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phases of 16 (Garland & Staff, 1979) to 20 (Belke & Pierce, 2015) trials, compared to the single
baseline period typical of human studies. Gathering such extensive baseline data allows for
systematic patterns of responding to be identified and their effects controlled for.
Systematic patterns of responding have been identified in previous animal studies,
including patterns consistent with habituation (e.g., McSweeney & Roll, 1993; McSweeney &
Hinson, 1992). McSweeney and Johnson (1994) found that food-deprived pigeons’ operant keypecking for grain followed a predictable pattern of responding, with response rates increasing to
a point during the session, and then decreasing. This pattern was observed regardless of the
length of time (0, 10, or 30 min) between sessions, indicating that although habituation may have
occurred, it is unlikely that it was the cause of the observed pattern of responding within
sessions. This suggests that, at least in pigeons, with food as reinforcement, if habituation occurs
within a session, it does not appear to affect subsequent sessions. Similar patterns of activity
have been observed in rats: McSweeney and Hinson (1992) found that operant lever-pressing
behavior in 30-90 min sessions followed the previously described pattern of responding, with
response rates peaking approximately 20 min into the session and then decreasing dramatically.
Although McSweeney’s study used food pellets as reinforcement, it is likely that a similar
pattern is observed with other types of reinforcements, such as wheel running, although the rates
of habituation might differ. Additionally, it is likely that the within-session effects observed in
pigeons can be applied to rats’ behavior in a similar paradigm: that the effects of habituation,
when present, will not carry over into subsequent sessions. Furthermore, whereas McSweeney
and Johnson’s (1994) study had a maximum of 30 min between sessions, the present study
separated sessions by at least 8 hrs, further decreasing the likelihood that habituation had an
effect on subsequent sessions.
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Regression to the Mean
Another issue that is mitigated by multiple pretest measures of engagement is the
potential for regression towards the mean (Campbell & Stanley, 2015). Participants are often
selected for studies of intrinsic motivation because they engage in the task at a relatively high
rate —against which a decrease in rate will be obvious—yet, as stated before, there is great
variability in engagement, even at an individual level. Thus, it is possible that individuals who
are selected for their high engagement at one time point may regress towards the mean in a
pattern that looks similar to an undermining effect, given that there is a tendency for individuals’
extreme scores to regress towards the mean on a given measure after a period of time (Sadish et
al., 2002). This threat is mitigated in studies with a control group, such as Lepper and colleagues’
(1973) study, as they randomly assigned a group of individuals with high baseline engagement to
the control and experimental conditions, and the control group’s level of engagement did not
regress. However, establishing a better sense of the individual’s level of engagement through
multiple baselines would provide further evidence against this possibility. It would also help to
more reasonably determine whether individuals in the experimental group indeed had high
intrinsic motivation, established across multiple points in time, rather than basing group
assignment on one data point that is known to be variable within individuals. Ensuring that
intrinsic motivation is high for each individual requires examining individual responses, rather
than solely group means.
Problems Addressed Through Analyzing Individual Responses
Whether the conditions required to test the overjustification effect occur reliably on an
individual level is often overlooked. Most studies simply look at aggregated pre- and post-test
means and determine whether those measures are statistically different from other measures
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(e.g., Deci, 1971; Lepper et al, 1973). However, as will be discussed in the following section,
this approach is problematic. To test the overjustification effect, the individual must be
intrinsically motivated in the task and the reward must have reinforcing effect on behavior.
However, to this author’s knowledge, no study (aside from single-subject designs) has examined
individual patterns in the data to ensure that only participants for whom these conditions are met
are included. In fact, the single-case designs that have been done have found no detrimental
effects of reinforcement contingencies (Akin-Little & Little, 2004; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975;
Mawhinney et al., 1989; Roane et al., 2003). Clearly, individual patterns of responding are
important in understanding the effect of the reward on intrinsic behavior.
Is the Task Intrinsically Motivating for the Individual?
Because the overjustification effect is purported to be true of tasks that are intrinsically
interesting to the individual, it is important that the experiment demonstrates that this is indeed
true. Studies generally only measure engagement at one point in time, and sometimes
differentially select individuals based on their high engagement (e.g., Lepper et al., 1973), or
employ tasks that are initially engaging because of their novelty. Lepper and colleagues gave the
children felt-tip markers, an uncommon item for children in the early 1970s. This design is
problematic because substantial fluctuation in engagement can often be seen by examining the
experiments’ control groups (e.g., Mawhinney, 1979) and in single-case designs that report
individual variability (e.g., Bright & Penrod, 2009). Therefore, the assumption that all
participants have a high level of initial interest in the tasks and maintain that peak interest may
be false. This is substantiated by Mawhinney’s (1979) reanalysis of Deci’s (1971) study: 41% of
participants in the control groups did not appear to be intrinsically motivated by the task that was
supposed to be intrinsically motivating. Multiple trials in the initial baseline phase are needed to
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establish a true baseline for intrinsic motivation. Additionally, the amount of engagement needs
to be high on an individual level to insure it is indeed intrinsically motivating. Along with
ensuring that each participant is intrinsically motivated by the task, it is also important to
examine how they respond to the reward.
Does the Reward Control the Behavior?
Mawhinney’s (1979) reanalysis reveals another important consideration: the distinction
between rewards and reinforcement. The reward used in Deci’s (1971) study did not serve to
reinforce the behavior of four of the 12 participants in the experimental condition. The terms
reinforcement and rewards are used interchangeably in the literature (Bright & Penrod, 2009;
Deci, 1971; Dollinger & Thelen, 1978; Mawhinney et al., 1989; Skaggs et al. 1992), yet the
distinction between them is important to self-determination theory because a prerequisite for
undermining is supposedly that the individual perceives the reward as “controlling” the behavior
(Skaggs et al., 1992). Even if the difference between reward versus reinforcement is purely
terminological, there remains the question of whether consequences have the effects claimed. It
was thus inappropriate for Deci (1971) to include these participants in the analysis, given that the
overjustification effect supposedly occurs only when the locus of causality becomes external.
Rewards are often issued with the intent of reinforcing a behavior, but any reinforcing effect of
rewards cannot be assumed without observing an increase in the probability of behavior
following administration of the reward. Even when this condition is met, it cannot be assumed
that something that at one time reinforces a behavior continues to do so under different
conditions, as the reinforcing value depends on the broader context of the situation (Perone,
2003).
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This issue can be addressed to some degree by the ABA reversal design by observing an
increase in behavior following the promise of a reward, although as discussed before, control
groups have been found to fluctuate substantially in the absence of a reward, sometimes in a
pattern consistent with reinforcement despite its absence (Mawhinney, 1979). Additionally,
authors do not generally specify that they examined individual participant’s data to ensure that
the reward increased behavior. Virtually none include preference assessments for the task or
rewards (Bright & Penrod, 2009 as the exception). Few studies include repeated pretest
measures, which would provide better evidence that an increase in engagement can be attributed
to the reward. An ABABA design can establish the reinforcing value with still more confidence:
if the expected reward is indeed reinforcing, the reward phase should have consistently higher
engagement than each baseline phase.
Did an Overjustification Effect Occur?
A final important question that Mawhinney’s (1979) design revealed by analyzing data
patterns on an individual level is perhaps an obvious one: Did an undermining effect occur?
Studies generally report only group averages, which seems valid on the surface. However, large
responses by a select few participants masked the fact that 58% (N = 12) of the reward group in
Deci’s (1971) experiment did not demonstrate an undermining effect (Mawhinney, 1979). Of the
nine individuals whose behavior was controlled by the reward, only five had a significant
decrease in engagement, consistent with the undermining hypothesis. Examining response
patterns at an individual level would allow for a better understanding of the relationship between
rewards and motivation.
One likely situation that would run counter to the overjustification hypothesis is that, in
the absence of reinforcement, the behavior that was previously elevated in probability by
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reinforcement falls back to the baseline rate, not below it. This is assuming that nothing else has
changed, such as the participant learning to generate reinforcement from the behavior, as in a
child discovering through a social skills program that playing with other children is fun. But, if
we account for habituation effects, or changes in discriminative and other conditions that
occurred during the first baseline, we should expect even a lower probability of engagement
when the reward is removed, at least for some subjects. The behavior would be expected to
decrease following the removal of the reinforcement, but not below the original baseline. Belke
and Pierce (2015) found results consistent with this hypothesis in an experiment with rats.
Through repeated trials, the probability of wheel running rose when sucrose was presented as a
reward but dropped when sucrose was removed. However, unrewarded wheel-running rates
remained consistent across successive trials. This pattern is consistent with an automatic
reinforcement explanation (Belke & Pierce, 2015). The authors argued that the overjustification
hypothesis predicts that baseline engagement would drop further and further each time a reward
was given and then withdrawn, as the behavior is further undermined each time, which was not
supported by their data. However, further investigation is needed to address the previously
discussed limitations of the overjustification paradigm and further aid understanding of the effect
of rewards.
Contrast Effects
An alternative way to conceptualize the pattern of responding observed in
overjustification effect experiments is as negative behavioral contrast. Specifically, a Crespi
effect occurs when there is a sudden shift (increase or decrease) in the amount of reinforcement
the individual receives relative to what they previously received (Crespi, 1942), as occurs in the
overjustification paradigm. Crespi (1942) compared rats in a control group who received a
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constant amount of food for running to rats who were given the same level of contingent food
but who had previously either received a smaller or greater amount of contingent food. Rats
increased from a smaller amount of food to a larger amount demonstrated an elation effect or
what we might now call positive contrast (see Reynolds, 1961). They ran more than subjects in
the control group who had received the constant amount throughout, even when the level of
reinforcement was the same. Rats whose reinforcement had been downshifted from a higher
level of reinforcement experienced a depression effect, or negative contrast, and ran less than the
control group who received the constant level of reinforcement. Even when reinforcement levels
were the same across the board, the history of previous reinforcement that was either above or
below the present reinforcement impacted the running rates of rats. This effect has also been
observed widely, including in capuchin monkeys (Rocha et al., 2020), and in humans ranging
from newborns (Kobre & Lipsitt, 1972) to college students (Morillo-Rivero et al., 2020). An
overjustification effect can thus also be conceptualized as a negative contrast effect, where
behavior decreases to below levels that would have occurred if the individual had never been
given the reward. Such a conceptualization would consider this pattern as an inherent property of
reinforcement and does not rely on the recipient’s metacognitive evaluations of their behavior
and interests as an explanation for the decrease in responding observed.
Using Rats as Subjects
Social Aspects of Reward Delivery
As discussed previously, the receipt of a reward from other people usually cannot be
isolated, in humans, from the social context in which it is received. Giving someone a reward for
a behavior may communicates that they ought to do it for solely for a reward, or that they should
not without—at least above some minimal level. There is a lot of meaning inherent in the size of
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tip, for instance. Implicit in telling children that they will be rewarded if they color is telling
them that coloring is a chore. That is, to a child, an adult offering an incentive for coloring might
suggest that the task is likely to be unpleasant, especially in the long term. Compare this to
offering the child money to mow the lawn. In contrast, although there may be social forces in
action in the rat-human relationship, it is unlikely that the delivery of rewards, even when they
are an expected aspect of a task, carries anything like the social implications of an adult offering
a child something for engaging in an activity they might not otherwise.
Reinforcement History and Insensitivity of Instructed Behavior
In addition to reward delivery’s inability to be isolated from a social context, it is also
impossible to test a behavior in humans independent of any previous learning histories that may
interfere with the given studies objectives. In Lepper and colleagues’ (1973) experiment,
children were instructed to earn “Good Player Awards.” Instructions commonly exert control on
children’s behavior, and have been found to be followed by positive consequences 22% of the
time (Atwater & Morris, 1988). Additionally, instructed or rule-governed behavior has been
found to be relatively insensitive to changes in contingencies (Catania et al., 1982, 1989;
Kaufman et al., 1966). As Catania (1984) argues, “to the extent that the (extrinsic reinforcers)
were reinforcers at all, they were established by instructions. Thus, the difference between
intrinsic and extrinsic reinforcers was probably less important than the insensitivity of instructed
behavior” (p. 240). It is unclear to what extent the children’s coloring behavior in Lepper et al.’s
(1973) study was controlled by the extrinsic reinforcement provided by the “Good Player
Award” versus instructional control. There is also an important distinction between rules that are
externally imposed and those that are self-instructed. That is, just because the participants were
given instructions does not mean participants were compliant with and attending to them
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(Catania et al., 1982; Hayes et al., 1986a; Hayes et al., 1986b; Matthews et al., 1987) . In
contrast, in the proposed experiment the reinforcement history of rats can be known and the
concerns regarding instructional control and externally imposed rules are eliminated. In addition,
the rats used in the present experiment did not have had a history of having rewards paired with
aversive tasks, further diminishing the likelihood of the reward communicating to the rat that the
examiner believes the task is unpleasant, as may occur in children as previously discussed.
Are Rats Valid Subjects for Testing the Overjustification Effect?
Thus far, the benefits of using rats have been addressed, but is it valid to use rats to test a
theory involving metacognitive processing and feelings of competence?
Applying Cognitive Principles in Animal Studies. Branch and Hackenberg (1998)
argue that assuming relevance of animal studies on humans requires first establishing continuity
within the processes between the two. This view is consistent with the view of the relevance of
analog studies generally. The point of the analog might be, as it is here, to remove as many
extraneous variables as possible and thus clarify the operation of the relevant variables. If
externally rewarding a response decreases its non-reinforced rate, then we can conclude that the
relationship of the reward to the task is the relevant property. We might fairly warn teachers
against using rewards for what they hope to have happen without them. But, if the social context
of the rewards is the key factor, then the advice would be about how to use rewards effectively
and not undermine their benefits by associating them with other negative properties. In animal
training, such a reward is called a poisoned cue (Pryor, 2002). This study is predicated
substantially on the notion that the rewards in intrinsic motivation studies are potentially
effective cues poisoned by troublesome social expectations.
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However, if the undermining effect is found in a more controlled environment, absent of
apparent poisoned cues, it would provide evidence that the confounds often present in
overjustification studies do not explain the results. That is, it would suggest that an
overjustification effect truly does exist. However, it would also indicate that the mechanisms
underlying the effect may not require the metacognitive interaction between behavior and selfobservation proposed by self-determination theorists to explain results. Rats are likely not
engaging in evaluations of their attitudes based on their behavior or engaging in behaviors to feel
competent. Thus, if an undermining effect is found, it suggests that the mechanisms through
which these attitudes are formed is likely much simpler. Such mechanisms could then be applied
to humans, providing a more parsimonious explanation of the overjustification effect observed in
the literature.
Previous Experiments Using Rats as Subjects. Despite the benefits, very little research
has been done on the overjustification effect in nonhuman animals. The research that has been
done has been on rats, using food as a reinforcement and wheel running as the intrinsically
interesting task. The assumption that wheel running is intrinsically motivating has support
(Iversen, 1993) as does the use of food as reinforcement for wheel running (Belke et al., 2017).
Garland and Staff (1979) found that rewarding food deprived rats’ wheel running with food
pellets led to a significant undermining effect initially, but that wheel running gradually returned
to baseline after repeated trials. However, the reward did not appear to reinforce the rat’s wheel
running, which is an important condition that must be met to test the overjustification effect.
Belke and Pierce (2014) also found an undermining effect when a sucrose reward was
removed, but sucrose did not actually increase wheel running rates, which is an important
condition in testing the overjustification effect. In a follow-up study, also using food deprived
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rats, Belke and Pierce (2015) found results inconsistent with the overjustification effect, but do
not present their baseline data for comparison to wheel-running following the removal of
sucrose. Their study differed from the traditional overjustification effect paradigm in that the rats
alternated between a condition where wheel running was the reinforcement for lever pressing
and where it was an operant for receiving sucrose solution. Although these studies have shed
some light on the overjustification effect, more can be learned through a design that more closely
replicates the overjustification paradigm and includes control groups. However, there are some
experimental considerations unique to their use, which will be discussed below.
Special Considerations for Using Rats as Subjects
Reward Expectancy. A particularly challenging aspect of using rats is the difficulty in
communicating to them that a previously reliable reward is no longer available for their work.
However, it is worth noting that this issue is not unique to rats: There is debate over whether
children in overjustification experiments actually understand that a reward is no longer available
(Reiss, 2005), and most of the studies from the human literature do not even mention this as a
possibility (e.g., Lepper et al., 1973). However, the literature on extinction-induced behavior
suggests that it is possible to tell a non-human organism that they are no longer getting a
previously reliable reward, the effect of which is usually an elevated level of emotionality and
sometimes aggression (Azrin et al., 1966). Additionally, rats can determine under what
conditions reinforcement occurs, and the rat-based studies previously discussed have had success
using variable light cues to signal the reinforcement phase as distinct from the baseline phase
(Belke & Pierce 2014, 2015). Thus, although the methods for doing so look different than
experiments with humans, it is possible to convey to a rat that they will not receive a reward for
completing a particular task. However, the elevated emotional response that often results raises

THE OVERJUSTIFICATION EFFECT IN RATS

22

another question: Are decreases in apparent intrinsic motivation when rewards are discontinued a
direct effect of the discontinuation, or secondary to an increase in competing emotional
responses, as in conditioned suppression (Estes & Skinner, 1941)? While this is a possibility, rats
are not usually the organism of choice in extinction-induced aggression experiments due to their
relative docility (Azrin et al., 1966).
Reward Delivery and Activity Level. It is also important to determine if the intake of
sucrose increases wheel running independent of contingencies, as access to the sucrose, or
reinforcement more generally, may increase arousal and subsequently, wheel running. Giving an
individual reinforcement can lead to increased general arousal (Killeen et al., 1978). Conveying
to a dog that they will receive a walk or treat will likely increases the dog’s general activity level
substantially, for instance. However, there is some evidence that this increase in general activity
may not translate to increased wheel-running rates: Weatherly and colleagues (2006) found that
an expected upcoming food pellet reinforcement (for lever pressing) did not increase the
frequency of wheel running in rats, and that the reinforcement increased only operant behaviors
but not activities associated with general arousal. Although it is possible that other factors may
have contributed to this finding, it suggests that if the administration of sucrose results in
increased activity level in the proposed experiment, this increase in arousal will not affect wheel
running frequency. Still, in the present experiment, a pair-matched noncontingent control group
that receives an equal amount of sucrose as the reward group, non-contingent upon wheel
running, controlled for this possibility.
Interaction Between Food and Wheel Running. Although food depriving animals prior
to experimentation is a long-practiced and widely used method of increasing the reinforcing
value of food (e.g., Pinchbeck, 1805; Skinner, 1938) research on activity-based anorexia

THE OVERJUSTIFICATION EFFECT IN RATS

23

indicates a relationship between food deprivation and wheel running that is external to, and may
interfere with, the objectives of the study. Food deprivation in rats has been found to induce high
levels of wheel running and weight loss (Dixon et al., 2003): When body weight decreases 1015%, there is a strong linear relationship between body weight and wheel running in rats
(Moskowitz, 1959). Additionally, Pierce and colleagues (1986) found that food deprivation to
75% body weight increased operant lever pressing for wheel access in rats. Thus, food
deprivation appears to increase the implicit motivation of activity in rats and apparently people
(Gutierrez, 2013; Pierce et al., 1994). Additionally, Pierce and colleagues (1986) found that
increased wheel running in rats resulted in a significant decrease in the reinforcement
effectiveness of food on lever pressing. Thus, “deprivation and satiation operations with respect
to food or running…act reciprocally as establishing operations” (Pierce et al., 1986, p. 209). This
further complicates the relationship between rewards and operant behavior in that specific
rewards and behavior, and their interaction, must be considered in making predictions and
recommendations. This may explain Belke and Pierce’s (2014) finding that sucrose did not
increase wheel-running rates in their (food-deprived) rats, which they suggest is because wheel
running already had a high base rate. However, the overjustification effect is predicted to occur
with high base rate behavior, so increasing the base rate of wheel running may also contribute to
the conditions necessary to test the overjustification hypothesis. Thus, a balance must be struck:
The rats should be food-deprived sufficiently such that the sucrose functions as a strong
reinforcer and so that wheel running occurs at a fairly high base rate, but they should not be food
deprived to the point where there is a ceiling effect on wheel running. In the present experiment,
rats were food deprived to 85% of their pre-experimental free-feeding weights, which is 5%
lower than the value commonly used in operant experiments.
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Still, activity anorexia presents a potential confound: rats that run more (because they are
reinforced) may lose more weight, causing them to run even more. If uncontrolled, this effect has
the potential to obscure and confound any undermining effects. Limiting the rats’ access to the
wheel to daily 30-min sessions helped to minimize this concern, as the rats exercised less and
thus maintained their weight. Additionally, the rats’ weights were monitored daily throughout the
experiment and their feeding was adjusted accordingly, as keeping rats at a constant percentage
of body weight has been found to keep activity constant as well (Moskowitz, 1959).
Wheel Running and Physical Conditioning. Another potential issue that arises from a
multiple-treatment reversal design is that the rats will likely become more physically fit,
allowing them to run for longer periods with less fatigue. Belke and Peirce (2016) found a
gradual increase in wheel running as their experiment progressed, which they speculated might
have been due to increased physical fitness. However, this factor may already be part of intrinsic
reinforcement in humans—a task can become easier to do with practice. For many activities that
children engage in, continued practice is needed before the behavior is maintained without
external reinforcement. A child who is learning to play the piano may need external
reinforcement initially to practice when playing is effortful and produces potentially
disappointing music. But, with the high engagement maintained by the reinforcer, they gradually
become more competent at the instrument, must expend less effort, and are able to produce better
music. Thus, the cost of the behavior decreases over time relative to its benefit, eventually
reaching the point where the behavior is maintained by automatic reinforcement and requires no
external contingencies. This is in some ways analogous to the decreased effort to run in rats,
relative to its intrinsic rewarding value—although there are clear differences between the two
situations, one being that in the child example piano playing was initially a low base rate
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behavior. Regardless of the parallels with studies on human participants, it is important to
determine to what extent physical conditioning impacts results. Thus, the amount of food
required to maintain 85% body weight will be closely monitored to determine if the amount of
energy required for wheel running changes as the experiment progresses.
In summary, there are several important potential confounds to consider in using wheel
running in rats as an analogue to the overjustification paradigm in humans. However, these can
be controlled for, and the use of rats provides the advantages of increased control of the social
aspects of rewards as well as more feasibly allowing for a multiple-treatment reversal design.
This, in turn, can better control for habituation effects and regression to the mean. The present
study differs from previous research in that individual responses were analyzed to ensure that the
conditions needed to test the effect were met. Additionally, it differs from other studies with rats
in that it more directly replicates the overjustification paradigm than the work by Belke and
Pierce (2014, 2015), using a multiple-treatment reversal design that included a pair-matched
noncontingent control group in addition to a no-reward control group.
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Study Purpose and Hypotheses
The purpose of the study was to determine if the overjustification effect, as illustrated by
Lepper and colleagues (1973), could be demonstrated in non-verbal, non-human organisms,
thereby controlling for and potentially revealing confounds related to the social and verbal
aspects of the rewards given in such experiments. Said differently, the study aimed to determine
if Lepper, and colleagues’ (1973) overjustification effect or the concept of automatic
reinforcement (Belke & Pierce, 2015) better predicted wheel-running rates in rats following
removal of predictable reinforcement.
Hypothesis
Given that previous studies on rats described above (Belke & Pierce, 2014, 2015) did not
find support for an overjustification effect, it was predicted that the effect will also not be
supported in the present study.
Overjustification Effect Prediction
Following the removal of reinforcement, wheel running will drop to below the former
baseline level and continue to decrease with each successive undermining condition, independent
of other possible confounding effects (see Figure 1). These undermining conditions will consist
of periods during which previously delivered reinforcement is omitted.
Automatic Reinforcement Prediction
In contrast, if following the removal of reinforcement, wheel running returns to the
former baseline level, these results would be consistent with an automatic reinforcement
hypothesis (Belke & Pierce, 2015). Or, simply, that there is no overjustification effect. Previous
studies with rats (Belke & Pierce, 2014, 2015) have found support for this hypothesis, and thus
support for this hypothesis is predicted for the present experiment.
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Method
General Procedures
The procedures used in these experiments were designed to correspond as directly as
possible to those used with the children in Lepper and colleagues’ (1973) overjustification study,
but also to other work in this area using rats (e.g., Belke & Pierce, 2014, 2015). That is, through
the course of the experiment, rats in the reward group lost previously reliable food rewards, and
the effects of that loss relative to an intrinsically motivated behavior (wheel running) was
measured in a manner that allowed for both increases and decreases to be observed. Specifically,
the rats in the reward condition were placed in the apparatus with free access to the wheel for
specified periods during which food reinforcement was delivered under certain conditions, but
not others. Their reinforced wheel-running rates were compared to their non-reinforced rates, and
to the rates of groups that received no reward or a non-contingent reward. These conditions were
analogs of the “expected reward,” and “no reward,” groups in overjustification studies inspired
by Lepper and colleagues (1973).
Subjects
The subjects were 14 young normal male Sprague-Dawley rats, obtained from a
commercial supplier and approval for the experiment was granted from Eastern Michigan
University’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC Approval Number: 2020098; Appendix A). Prior to and during the experiment, the rats were housed individually or in
pairs in clear polycarbonate hanging cages with free access to food (Purina #5001 or equivalent)
and water. Bedding composed of wood shavings or a similar substance was present in all cages
and changed weekly, and the housing area had a 12-hour on/off light cycle. For several weeks
prior to the start of the experiment, and throughout the experiment, all subjects were weighed
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daily (occasional one-day breaks excepted), and each rat’s weight was reduced to 85% of their
previous maximum obtained weight by limiting daily feedings from adlib feeding to 5 grams of
food per day. During the experiment, the 85% level was maintained by adjusting daily postexperimental feedings, adding approximately 2 grams of food for each gram of weight under
criterion or subtracting approximately 2 grams of food for each gram over criterion. This
procedure kept weights within one or two percent of the target (see Todd et al.,1997).
Conditions
Rats were distributed in a snake draft fashion (i.e., in the opposite order each draft round)
between the three groups listed below, based on their average baseline, so that there were no
substantial differences between groups in average baseline running rates at the beginning of the
experiment. The average wheel-running rate in the last five sessions of the initial baseline phase
was 62 revolutions per session for the expected-reward group and 58 revolutions for the
combined control groups.
Expected Reward Group. Seven rats received 0.1 ml of 50% sucrose solution for every
15 wheel revolutions (by average) in the experimental phase, as described below.
No-Reward Control Group. Four rats received no reward for wheel running although,
consistent with the reward group, the wheel stopped for 15 sec after 15 wheel revolutions (by
average) but 0.1 ml of water was dispensed.
Pair-Matched Noncontingent Control Group. To control for a potential effect sucrose
may have on general arousal and energy level, three rats received the same amount of sucrose as
three rats in the reward group, but received the whole amount at one time in their home chamber
prior to their experimental session, thus assuring that their exposure to sucrose is non-contingent.
This was done to minimize the potential for the rats to inadvertently develop an association
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between the wheel and the sucrose. Consistent with the no-reward group, the wheel stopped after
15 revolutions (by average) for 15 sec and 0.1 ml of water was dispensed.
Procedure
Acclimation
One week prior to the experimental procedure, all rats spent 30 min each day in the
experimental apparatus while a sliding metal door (9.0 x 6.8 cm) blocked wheel access, to allow
for acclimation to the chamber (see Figure 2). Additionally, all rats were exposed to
approximately 10-15 ml of 50% sucrose solution in their home cages prior to the experimental
phase to acclimate them to it and to ensure the reinforcing value of sucrose for each individual
rat. All rats rapidly consumed all the sucrose that was presented, demonstrating its potentially
high reinforcement value.
Baseline Phase
This condition was the same for all rats. The rats were placed in the cage attached to the
wheel and allowed free access to the wheel for 30-min sessions, twice each day. The first seven
rats were run between 7:45 and 8:45 a.m. and 4:45-5:45 p.m., each day, and the second set of
seven were run immediately after. This was consistent across all phases. The wheel stopped on a
fixed-ratio schedule of 15 revolutions for a 15-sec pause, 0.1 ml of water was dispensed, and a
tone played, in keeping with Belke and Pierce’s (2015) procedures. These conditions mimicked
those of the sucrose phase in every way except for the dispensing of sucrose, so that time
accessing the reinforcer and the potentially aversive properties of activity interruption did not
confound the experimental phase. An audible click and the termination of the tone signified
when the running wheel was unlocked and available for running. The initial baseline phase
continued until the wheel running was stable for most rats, as determined by visual inspection of
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the data and appearance of stability. Stability was later confirmed during data analysis: there
were no new highs or new lows in the last five sessions for all rats except Rats 2 and 11. In
addition, the average percent daily change for the last five days of the baseline phase was less
than 10% for 10 of the 14 rats (excepting Rats 6, 9, 12 and 14). Thus, stability was achieved even
though it was initially determined by examining visual data rather than numerical. Stability
occurred after 29 sessions. Subsequent baseline phases consisted of a minimum of six 30-min
sessions, although the final baseline phase was drawn out for longer to provide the opportunity
for more stable responding.
Sucrose Phase
The sucrose phase was identical to the baseline phase, except that sucrose was
administered as reinforcement for wheel running for the expected-reward group and a loud tone
distinguished this phase from the baseline phase. Like the baseline condition, the wheel operated
on a FR-15 revolution schedule for 30-min sessions, but 0.1 ml of sucrose solution was delivered
to the expected reward group (instead of water) during the 15-sec period after the wheel stopped.
As stated previously, the pair-matched noncontingent control group received the same amount of
sucrose that the reward group received but they received it all at once in their home chamber
immediately prior to their session. During the session, both the pair-matched noncontingent
control and the no-reward control group received 0.1 ml of water each interval, although rats did
not generally drink this water. Rats alternated between the baseline and experimental condition
in an ABABA design.
Apparatus
The main apparatus was a set of seven Richter-type steel running wheels (manufactured
by Wahmann; 35.5 cm in diameter, 11.0 cm wide; Appendix B) with an electronic turns-
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counting apparatus and a solenoid-operated rubber brake added. A small wire cage (13 x 15.5 x
25.8 cm) was connected to the wheel via a closable guillotine-type doorway (6.8 x 9.0 cm). This
doorway was located 3.8 cm up from the floor of the cage and 6.0 cm from the left side of the
cage. A liquid receptacle was attached to the inside of the wheel, and a computer-controlled
solenoid valve dispensed 0.1 ml of sucrose or water (depending on condition) from a cylindrical
dispenser into the receptacle. A loud tone that was clearly audible throughout the experimental
room was played through the computer speakers to signal that contingent-sucrose was available,
while a separate tone played on each wheel each time sucrose or water was dispensed. The
dispensing of sucrose, the operating of the wheel brake and LED lights, and the recording of data
was controlled by computers interfaced to the wheels through relay and solid-state devices. The
computer program used for the experiment based a pre-existing application written by the
author’s mentor in Lingo using Macromedia and Adobe Director versions 8-12, an authoring
system designed for creating video games. The computer was interfaced to the wheels using
Service-USB Classic digital controllers by Böening and Kallenbach of Dormund, Germany, and
multiple-relay interface boards from Velleman of Belgium.
Measures
The main dependent measures was the total number of rotations, consistent with those
used in similar studies (Belke et al., 2017; Belke & Pierce, 2014). Additionally, within session
changes in behavior were recorded and analyzed to determine if there are ancillary effects of the
experimental conditions on the rats’ behavior.
Data Analysis
The graphs of the rats were visually inspected following decision rules recommended by
Parsonson and Baer (1978). In addition, the standard mean difference (SMD) calculation, which
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is analogous to Cohen’s d (Olive & Smith, 2005), was used to calculate an effect size of sucrose
exposure on subsequent baseline running rates. In addition to the above analyses related to the
main research goals and hypotheses, further analyses were conducted to ensure that the
conditions required for testing the hypotheses have been met, such as the reinforcing value of
sucrose.
Additionally, within session activity patterns were analyzed to determine the rats’ typical
running patterns throughout the course of a session to determine if session duration is likely to
impact the conclusions drawn and if operant wheel running patterns are similar to those found in
other operant conditioning studies (McSweeney & Hinson, 1992; McSweeney & Johnson, 1994).
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Results
Main Findings
The study’s main aim was to determine whether wheel-running rates decreased below
initial baseline running rates after reinforcement had been administered and then withdrawn.
That is, did temporarily reinforcing wheel running “undermine” the intrinsic value of running to
the rat?
Figure 3 shows the average running rates across all the phases of the experiment for the
expected-reward group rats. Wheel running for rats in the expected-reward group increased by
approximately 96% (60 revolutions) when running-contingent sucrose was delivered, although
this was highly variable (SD = 92). However, when the contingent sucrose was withdrawn, the
average number of wheel turns then decreased by approximately 30% in the expected-reward
group compared to a 5% increase in wheel running in control groups (see Table 1). Despite this
expected decrease, the rates of running in the return to baseline in the expected reward group was
not systematically below those rates in the initial baseline phase. The possible reasons for the
small increase will be explored in the Discussion section.
Whereas looking at aggregate data helps draw general conclusions, the overjustification
effect is an individual, rather than group, effect. Thus, it is important to examine data of wheel
running of individual rats across all phases of the experiment to determine whether the
responding of individual rats is generally congruent with the aggregate phase. Aggregate phase
data (Figure 4) and session-by-session data (Figure 5) show that the proportion of running rates
per session in all the rats in the expected-reward group reliably increased when sucrose was
administered for running, then decreased when sucrose was withdrawn—but not below the initial
baseline rates. There was some variability in the magnitude of wheel running difference between
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phases: some rats showed large differences in wheel running between reward and baseline
phases (e.g., Rats 4, 9 and 10) and others showed smaller differences (e.g., Rats 3 and 11). See
Appendix C for raw data for all rats across sessions.
Figure 6 shows the SMD between the last 10 sessions of the initial baseline and the 10
sessions of the final baseline for all rats in the experiment. In this figure, lower values reflect
decreases in wheel running after the administration of sucrose (i.e., an undermining effect). The
average effect size of contingent-sucrose on subsequent baseline wheel running for the expectedreward group was 0.55, although they were highly variable (SD = 0.94; See Table 2), indicative
of a medium positive effect, based on standards proposed by Cohen (1988). That is, the
administration of rewards for wheel running moderately increased running in the final noreinforcement baseline phase relative to the initial baseline. Five out of seven rats in the
expected-reward group included zero change within their 95% confidence interval, suggesting no
effect of sucrose withdrawal on baseline wheel running. For the other two rats (Rats 1 and 14),
the effect size was well above zero, indicating increased wheel running in the final baseline
phase compared to the initial phase. This pattern was also present in some rats in the control
groups. Thus, the increase in wheel running may have been due to other factors, such as
increased physical fitness, rather than the sucrose reinforcement. These factors will also be
explored more fully in the Discussion section. Overall, the results provide strong support that the
repeated administration and withdrawal of contingent sucrose resulted in either no change or
possibly an increase in unreinforced wheel running over time.
Control Groups
Running data across sessions for the pair-matched non-contingent control group (Figure
7) and the no-sucrose control group (Figure 8) did not reveal the same systematic changes across
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conditions that were present in the expected-reward group. While revolutions increased by 95%
in the expected-reward group during the sucrose phase, they increased by 17% (< 1 revolution
per session increase) in the control groups. There were no systematic effects of non-contingent
sucrose on wheel running for the rats in the pair-matched non-contingent control group,
compared to the enhancement of running by contingent sucrose in the expected-reward group.
There were also no systematic patterns of responding in the no-sucrose control group. In
addition, while the expected-reward group’s wheel running decreased by 30% when sucrose was
withdrawn, the control groups’ running increased by 5% during that time. As will be examined
further in the Discussion section, this provides further support that contingent sucrose caused the
observed increase in running in the reward phase
Ancillary Analyses
In addition to analyses related to the identified research question, other analyses of the
data may further the field’s understanding of the wheel running behavior of rats.
Differences in Morning and Evening Running
Differences in morning and evening running rates were examined prior to beginning the
first sucrose phase to determine whether differences in running could impact study results. As
can be seen in Figure 9, which includes a sample of revolutions-per-session of rats across the
expected-reward and control groups, the number of revolutions in the morning and evening
sessions were highly similar. Morning running rates were sometimes higher than evening
running rates, although this pattern is not consistent. In addition, phase changes never occurred
in between a morning and evening phase, and rats never ran in the evening if they had not run in
the morning. Therefore, it is not likely that the differences in morning and evening running,
when they did occur, affected the study results in a systematic way.
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Within-Session Responding
A sample of within-session cumulative records from select rats can be seen in Figure 10.
Examination of cumulative records of within-session wheel running indicated that rats tended to
run more during the first half of the session, with almost all rats completing at least a few
revolutions at the beginning of the session. Rats generally continued to run in the second half of
the session, although often at a reduced rate. During the sucrose phases, the rats in the reward
group followed a similar pattern of higher running rates in the first half of the session, although
high rates of running were often observed throughout the session in these phases.
Individual Differences in Patterns of Responding
There were large differences between the rats in the amount of initial baseline running.
For example, Rat 12 ran an average of < 1 revolution per session in the last five sessions of the
initial baseline, while Rat 10 ran an average of 159 revolutions. There were also differences in
the variability of wheel running. For instance, Rat 3 maintained a small but consistent number of
revolutions across sessions, while Rat 10 engaged in high levels of wheel running that were also
highly variable. As stated previously, rats were assigned to groups and matched based on their
initial-baseline rates of running, so that there were no substantial differences between running
rates in the groups at the beginning of the reward phase.
Relative to the reward phase, while the administration of sucrose resulted in reliable
increases in wheel-running rates for the expected-reward group, the magnitude of the increase
varied considerably. For example, Rat 3 showed small but reliable increases in wheel running
during the reward phase, while Rat 9’s wheel running increased about three times as much (as
Rat 3) in response to the administration of contingent sucrose. Of note, Rat 9 did not engage in
any wheel running for the first three sessions of the phase and thus did not contact the
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contingency until the fourth session. In addition, for some rats, the administration of contingent
sucrose led to rapid increases in responding. In Rats 9 and 4 (but not in other rats), the increase
was more gradual. Despite rapid responding in the reward phase, sucrose did not appear to
impact the variability of responding in the subsequent baseline phase.
The effect of the withdrawal of sucrose on rats in the expected-reward group on baseline
running was also variable across subjects. In Rats 3 and 11, the third baseline phase was slightly
lower than the second baseline, possibly because there was less extinction-induced running in the
third phase. However, this pattern is both inconsistent across rats in the sucrose phase and
present in some rats in the no-sucrose control group (Rats 2 and 5), so this pattern may just be
due to the expected variability of wheel running across time. Regardless of the cause, the rates
are still well within the range of the initial baseline. Overall, there were no consistent patterns
across rats other than increased wheel running when the rats received contingent sucrose, and a
return to baseline (but not below it) when the sucrose was withdrawn.
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Discussion
The main aim of the present study was to determine whether administering and
subsequently withdrawing contingent sucrose would undermine the intrinsic value of wheel
running in rats. Wheel running was chosen because rats will run reliably without the need for
added reinforcement, and rats in this experiment generally ran at high rates in the baseline phase.
Thus, wheel running in rats appears to be an intrinsically motivated behavior and thus a good
candidate for studies on the potential undermining of intrinsic reinforcement in non-human
animals. Overall, the pattern of responding in the present results is consistent with similar studies
by Belke and Pierce (2014, 2015) and with an automatic reinforcement hypothesis: wheel
running returned to the level that it was maintained by automatic or intrinsic reinforcement,
rather than being exhibiting an overjustification or undermining effect. Baseline running rates
after sucrose had been withdrawn were at the same level or higher than the running rates prior to
the administration of contingent sucrose. Of course, the notion that rats would justify, much less
overjustify, their responding relative to reinforcement is untenable given they are non-verbal and
unlikely to be attributing their behavior to internal or external control. Of course, when animal
models are used, the degree of correspondence to human subjects is always, to some degree,
inferred. It is always possible that results from studies with non-human studies seem analogous
but are due to entirely different unrecognizable variables. Future research in this area might
directly examine the parameters and adequacy of the animal model in addition to what the model
might seem to show. Still, stripping the paradigm down to solely examine the impact of
reinforcement on behavior suggests that the effect as it is found in human studies may be due to
differences in methodology, cognitive mechanisms of discounting, or the social and verbal
aspects of reward delivery, which will each be discussed in turn later.
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At its most fundamental, the overjustification effect is an interaction effect between
conditions in a multielement time series design. The variable in question is not just the current
amount of reinforcement, but also the difference (contrast) between existing and previous
reinforcement (Hains & Baer, 1989). However, this study seems to show that these contrasting
interaction effects are not seen. Behavior was controlled by the rate of reinforcement and was not
impacted by the contrast between existing and previous reinforcement. In fact, responding
increased from the initial baseline following the administration and withdrawal of sucrose. Thus,
any sequential negative contrast effects, if they exist, are masked by other variables. Interaction
effects in multielement designs are to be expected but are usually so small as to not be a concern
and are often masked by other variables, if they exist at all (Hains & Baer, 1989). The
differences in experimental design and control across overjustification experiments may mask
and unmask these potential interaction effects. This would suggest that the overjustification
effect is an ephemeral effect that has more to do with experimental design and other variables
than an inherent property of reinforcement. It is also possible that results are different from those
of the human literature because humans are sensitive to the perceived size of social rewards in a
way that rats are not. It would also be valuable to repeat this study with pigeons, which are
reliably and highly sensitive to changes in reward duration (Rachlin & Green, 1972).
Although a negative contrast effect was not observed, a positive behavioral contrast may
have occurred. The rats ran more in the second reinforcement phase than in the first one. Said
differently, they ran more after sucrose was withdrawn and then re-administered than they did
when initially presented with contingent sucrose. However, these differences in running rates
were not consistent enough to draw well supported conclusions and could also have been due to
other factors. The rats may have run less in the first sucrose phase simply because they were
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initially unfamiliar with the contingencies and did not reach stability in the first reinforcement
phase. Or perhaps an increase physical fitness in the second sucrose phase resulted in a decrease
in the response cost of running in later phases relative to the first phase. These were older rats,
and prior to this experiment, the rats had led quite a sedentary life in a laboratory environment.
Thus, physical fitness from running was a likely factor. Additional experimental controls would
be needed to differentiate between these possible explanations. For instance, the experiment
could be repeated with younger rats or rats that had been given an extended period of access to
the wheels for several weeks or months.
In addition to increased running rates in subsequent sucrose phases, some rats in the
expected-reward group demonstrated increased running in subsequent baseline phases compared
to the initial baseline. It is possible that extinction bursts in early baseline sessions brought up the
averages of the whole phase. However, given that there is an upward trend in running in the
control groups as well, it is likely that the increased running is due to increased physical fitness.
A similar pattern was found in Belke and Pierce’s (2014, 2015) experiments. It is possible,
although unlikely, that this increased physical fitness served to overshadow an extant
overjustification effect. However, the trend observed in the control group is slight, and the
proponents of the overjustification effect do not suggest that an undermining effect is slight (e.g.,
Deci et al., 1999; Lepper et al., 1973). In fact, the potential increased physical fitness provides an
interesting consideration for the reinforcement of behavior in children. It is possible that, as was
observed in the rats, reinforcing a child’s behavior might lead them to become more proficient in
it. Indeed, this is often the goal of rewarding the child for practice. As the child becomes
proficient, the response cost for engaging in the behavior decreases relative to the individual’s
intrinsic motivation to perform the task. If, for example, the child is rewarded for practicing the
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piano, their skill is likely to increase while the effort (response cost) required to play decreases.
The child might then increase their playing of the piano for intrinsic motivation, just as the rats
increased their wheel running.
Before considering the reason for the difference in results between the present study and
the literature on humans, it is important to consider whether the conditions required to test the
overjustification effect have been met. An overjustification effect is predicted to occur when a
highly intrinsically motivating task is rewarded (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973). Thus, it is
important to determine (a) whether wheel running was sufficiently intrinsically motivating and
(b) whether sucrose served as an effective reward (i.e., reinforced) wheel running. As previously
discussed, an examination of whether the reward served to increase behavior is not generally
established in overjustification effect experiments (Mawhinney et al., 1989), and the metric for
determining levels of intrinsic motivation through engagement in general is arbitrary. Still, in
utilizing the standards that the field has used thus far, the rats were intrinsically motivated to run,
as they generally engaged in fairly high levels of wheel running without external reinforcement.
Although an overjustification effect may not be predicted for rats with lower levels of wheel
running (e.g., Rats 4 and 9), the rats that were highly motivated did not demonstrate and
undermining effect either (e.g., Rats 4 and 10).
With respect to whether the sucrose served as an effected and expected reward, the
pattern of increased responding in the expected-reward group when sucrose was administered,
relative to baseline running levels, suggests that contingent sucrose reinforced wheel running. In
addition, differences between the expected-reward and control groups provide further evidence
for the reinforcing effect of contingent sucrose. As an aside, for rats in both control groups, the
wheel stopped after every 15 revolutions for 15 sec, just as in the expected-reward group, but the
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solenoid dispensed water, to control for the time that the expected-reward group spent ingesting
the sucrose. Given that there were no systematic effects across the control groups, it is likely that
the changes in responding that were observed in the expected-reward group were the result of the
administration and withdrawal of contingent sucrose rather than other experimental factors, such
as the passage of time or the excitatory properties of sucrose alone. In addition, while reward
expectancy could not be facilitated by telling the rat that they would receive a reward, the high
responding in the expected-reward group during the sucrose phase suggested that they had come
to expect the reward.
Not only did sucrose serve as an effective reinforcement for wheel running, the high
concentration of 50%, compared to 15% used in Belke and Pierce’s (2014, 2015) research, made
it a particularly potent reinforcer. This experiment was originally planned for a 15% sucrose
solution, to replicate the work by Belke and Pierce (2014, 2015), but accidentally employed 50%
instead. This serendipitous error resulted in a very potent reinforcer that did not change the
volume of reinforcement the rats received with each administration. Said differently, the rats
received the same amount of sucrose solution as the rats in Belke and Pierce’s (2014, 2015)
studies, but the quality and flavor of the reinforcer was increased. The overjustification
hypothesis would predict that the more powerful the reinforcement is, the more likely an
individual is to attribute their engagement to that reinforcer (Lepper et al., 1973); however, the
effect was not supported when either 15% or 50% sucrose solution was used. Future research
should examine whether varying the reinforcement quality for humans (while keeping other
factors related to reinforcement delivery constant), results in different patterns of responding
following reinforcement withdrawal. In addition, the use of sucrose water may facilitate
manipulation of reinforcement quality in animal research generally without confounding it with
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duration of reinforcement or differences in eating patterns that occur when presenting differing
numbers and sizes of food pellets, for example.
Other unplanned events also occurred occasionally throughout the course of the
experiment, such as the computer program freezing, which required that the session be restarted,
and the dispensers not dispensing the full amount of sucrose due to its high viscosity (see
Appendix D). However, these problems were quickly resolved, did not occur systematically to
one group relative to another, and did not appear (from corresponding anomalies in the data) to
have substantially impacted results. Taken together, the data suggest that the differences
observed between this study and others are not due to failure to meet the necessary conditions
required to test the hypothesis, such as the use of an intrinsically motivating task and the use of
an expected reward. In fact, the multiple treatment reversal design allows for a closer
examination of these variables than the traditional ABA design.
This utilization of a multiple-treatment reversal design allowed for a closer examination
of several factors that typically cannot be answered by the ABA design. As stated in the
Introduction, participants in overjustification effect studies are typically selected for their high
engagement (intrinsic motivation) at one time point, and thus their decrease in responding in the
subsequent baseline phase may be due to regression towards the mean rather than an
undermining effect. By utilizing the extended baseline, and waiting until the rats’ running rates
were stable, it is unlikely that regression artifacts impacted the results of the present study. In
fact, the running rates of rats in the first session were generally much lower than the rates that
they ran when they achieved stability, suggesting that it may be beneficial to ensure that the
participants have achieved stability prior to introducing the reward, though this is not done in
human studies.
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Another consideration that was previously discussed in the potential for subjects to
habituate to the intrinsically motivating task. Within-session data showed that rats generally ran
more in the initial half of the session, consistent with research on within-session responding in
pigeons (McSweeney & Hinson, 1992; McSweeney & Roll, 1993). This suggests that
habituation on wheel running may have occurred within sessions, although the pattern of
responding could also be explained by fatigue—a distinction itself worthy of study using this
paradigm. Given that wheel running tended to increase gradually throughout the experiment in
all groups, neither within nor between-session habituation is not likely to have impacted results.
As an aside, the ability for computers to collect detailed within-session data, as illustrated by the
electronic cumulative records collected in this study, allows for a more fine-grained analysis of
results than most studies in this area have attempted, and may further inform the impact of
rewards on behavior. It is possible that relying exclusively on overall session data, as it typically
done, rather than within-session data, masks other interesting and important within-session
changes. Future research should collect and examine within-session responding in humans and
attempt to segregate the variables responsible for observed changes in responding.
In many human studies of overjustification and intrinsic reward, the reward is a single
event delivered once, rather than a series of reinforced sessions (e.g., Deci, 1971; Lepper et al.,
1973). Future research should examine the effects of repeated presentations of rewards in
humans in manner similar to that used in this study (multiple-treatment reversal with an extended
baseline), to determine if an overjustification effect is observed. If the effect is not observed, we
might conclude that the results of other studies were not due to an overjustification effect but
were due to related to factors inherent in the paradigm’s methodology, such as habituation or
regression towards the mean, as previously discussed. It is also possible that an extended period
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of reward may “reset” any cognitive interference with the reward effect, undermining the
overjustification effect. In applied behavior analysis with humans, in which extended periods of
externally imposed rewards for target responding are common, absent any attempt to generalize
the responding to natural reinforcers, it is expected that the level of responding will return to
approximately the earlier baseline level rather than being appreciably increased or decreased
(Cooper et al., 2020; Stokes & Baer, 1977). Conversely, future research should also determine
whether it is possible to replicate a paradigm with rats that is more similar to that used in human
studies (i.e., an ABA design), by presenting a powerful reinforcement for only one trial and
observe the effects on intrinsic motivation. However, this may not be possible with rats. Still, as
discussed previously, there is some debate over whether this can reliably done in the children in
which the effect has been studied, as the children might not be listening to the experimenters or
understand when they will or will not receive a reward. That is, sometimes the cognitive abilities
that are presumed to be required are also assumed, but not demonstrated, to be present in the
children who participate in the overjustification studies.
Some individuals argue that the overjustification effect occurs because the individual
cognitively discounts their own intrinsic interest, and then reattributes their engagement to be
due the reward. When the reward disappears, the previous intrinsic value is not present, and the
behavior is reduced below the previous baseline. Thus, an overjustification effect would not be
predicted in rats, as they are not able to engage in this cognitive process. However, as previously
discussed, some studies have found support for an overjustification effect in children as young as
20 months old (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008), long before the required cognitive abilities have
been demonstrated to be developed (Kassin & Ellis, 1988). Other studies also show the absence
of the overjustification effect in verbal humans under certain conditions (Condry, 1977;
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Dickinson, 1989; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1998; Pierce & Cameron, 2002). That is, they
respond to changes in reinforcement as the rats in this experiment (and in Belke and Pierce’s
work) do.
In addition, differences in findings between this study and those with humans may be
because humans are particularly sensitive to the social aspects of reward delivery and generally
have a history of having rewards paired with aversive tasks (Kassin & Ellis, 1988). The rats in
this study did not have a history of having rewards be associated with aversive tasks in the way
that children in the human studies likely had. It may be that the overjustification effect can be
better explained by the participant’s previous history of receiving rewards for aversive tasks, and
thus developing an aversion to any activity for which they receive a reward, as the socialdevelopmental model of discounting suggests (Kassin & Ellis, 1988). Adults do not generally
give rewards to children for eating ice cream, for example, but may reward them for eating
unpreferred vegetables. Thus, the verbal aspects of reward delivery and their typical association
with aversive tasks may be more relevant to the “undermining” of intrinsic engagement than the
association of a reward with a task. Future research should examine whether a history of
receiving rewards for aversive tasks is related to the individual’s likelihood of discounting
intrinsic factors in an overjustification paradigm. It may be that adults can deliver rewards in
ways that do not activate a child’s discounting schema and prevent them from concluding that
they have been asked to engage in a chore. Said differently, there may be ways to use rewards
that can capitalize on their benefit without communicating to the child that they should not
engage in the task in the absence of the rewards. Future research is needed to establish whether
discounting and reattribution are the best explanation for the effect found in humans, under what
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conditions each explanation might be appropriate and whether rewards can be presented without
activating the child’s discounting schema.
The study also differed from those in humans in that it did not rely on rule-governed or
instructed behavior, which has been found to respond differently to changing contingencies
compared to non-rule-governed behavior (Catania et al., 1982). In fact, the purpose of this study
was to remove social and verbal variables related to the reward. Given that no effect was found,
it suggests that these verbal and social aspects are key to the overjustification effect. Future
research in humans should examine whether an overjustification effect is found when
contingencies are shaped in such a way that the individual does not receive instructions from
others or formulate self-instructions (see Catania et al., 1982).
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Conclusion
In summary, the examined constructs of intrinsic motivation and overjustification are
poorly and differently operationalized in the literature, and this study was designed to sidestep
many of the difficulties in operationalizing these variables within the verbal and social realm.
This experiment examined the fundamentals of the impact of reinforcement on motivation,
without the other confounds and verbal aspects, upon which future research can now build.
Further research is needed to determine whether the differences articulated throughout this paper
are the result of differences in history of reinforcement for aversive tasks, methodological
control, cognitive abilities related to discounting, or the social milieu that rewards were delivered
in. If the factors that contribute to the overjustification effect can be further delineated, parents
and teachers may be better able to capitalize on a useful tool for promoting a child’s behavior
while avoiding any detrimental effects on motivation.
Overall, the results of the present experiment do not provide support for the
overjustification effect. When all the verbal and social variables are eliminated, the effect
disappears. The overjustification effect is not an inherent quality of reinforcement, but rather
may be an entirely social effect based on extraneous factors inherent in the experimental
paradigm. Given this study’s results, it is not possible to conclude that reward undermines
intrinsic motivation because it is obvious that other variables are more important and facilitating
changes in behavior.
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Table 1
Average Wheel Revolutions Across Phases
Rats by Group
BL1
S1
BL 2
S2
BL3
Expected Reward
1
69.2
108.2
96.2
132.2
99.2
3
21.2
36.2
18
42
42
4
87.4
150
90.2
144
84.4
9
30.4
84.2
42.2
204.2
69.6
10
159.2
270
171
342.2
198
11
36.6
42.2
60.2
90
42.4
14
36
51
69.2
123.2
60.8
Pair-Matched Non-Contingent Control
6
39
42.2
42.2
39.2
12
8
111
120.2
108
132.2
150.4
13
48.2
18
33
84.2
33
No-Sucrose Control
2
113
112.7
141.2
144
96.4
5
30
27.4
30
9.2
18
7
63.2
27
60
51.2
51
12
0.6
15
6.2
21
12
Note. Averages presented are of the total revolutions in the last five sessions in each phase. BL=
Baseline Phase, S = Sucrose Phase.
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Table 2
Standard Mean Differences Between Baselines Before and After Sucrose Phases
95% Confidence Interval
Rats by Group
SMD
Lower
Upper Limit
Expected Reward
1
1.87
0.82
2.92
3
-0.01
-0.89
0.86
4
-0.29
-1.17
0.59
9
0.77
-0.14
1.68
10
0.07
-0.8
0.95
11
-0.33
-1.2
0.55
14
1.75
0.72
2.78
Pair-Matched Non-Contingent Control
6
-0.98
-1.91
-0.06
8
0.93
0.01
1.86
13
-0.45
-1.34
0.44
No-Sucrose Control
2
-0.76
-1.67
0.15
5
-1.50
-2.49
-0.051
7
-0.81
-1.72
0.1
12
1.03
0.09
1.96
Note. Standard mean differences are the standardized differences between the last 10 sessions of
the initial baseline and the 10 sessions of the final baseline phase. Values below zero represent an
undermining effect.
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Figure 1
Alternative Hypothesized Patterns of Responding
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Note. Numbers have been added for illustrative purposes.
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Figure 2
Timeline for Experimental Procedures

Note. Each rat will participate in 30-minute session each morning and evening day.
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Figure 3
Combined Expected-Reward Group Wheel Running Across Phases
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Appendix B: Wheel-Running Apparatus

Note. Experimental chamber and Wahmann-style running wheel. Measurements are in centimeters.
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Appendix C: Wheel Revolution Raw Data
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Appendix D: Unplanned Experimental Events Log
Date

Session Number

Rat(s) affected

Incident

9/5/20

3

1-7

9/6/20

5

1-7

9/10/20

10

1-7

9/14/20

18

1-7

9/20/20

30

3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14

9/22/20

34

3, 12

9/23/20

36

4,10

Program froze, session
needed to be restarted
Program froze, session
needed to be restarted
Program froze, session
needed to be restarted
Program froze, session
needed to be restarted
Had to restart program
because forgot to give
pair-matched controls
sucrose
Rat 3 completed the first
four minutes of Rat 12’s
session.
Wheels did not appear
to be expelling sucrose

